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I. Introduction
The First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of 
physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than 
act. 
–Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.1
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government 
for a redress of grievances. 
–U.S. CONST. amend. I.
* LL.M., UCLA Law School, 2011; J.D., University of California, Hastings College
of the Law, 2010; Masters of Science in Journalism, Northwestern University, 2004; 
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, Mass Communications, University of California, 
Berkeley, 2003. I would like to thank Professor Curt Hessler for his support throughout 
the writing process. 
1. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975).
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Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old, committed suicide after 
receiving online MySpace messages from a fictitious boy.  Her former 
friend’s parent, Lori Drew, and Drew’s employee created a false 
MySpace account.  They pretended to be a boy in order to elicit 
statements from Meier that might reveal how Meier felt about Drew’s 
daughter.2  In this pursuit of gossip, the character began to take on a 
more human shape in Megan’s mind.  Meier developed feelings for 
this fictitious boy.  In an attempt to get Meier to stop liking “him,” 
“he” made very cruel statements to Meier, such as “[t]he world would 
be a better place without you.”3  Meier had a history of depression 
and the hurtful statements from the “boy” led Meier to take her own 
life.  Meier’s mom provided a very effective description of 
cyberbullying: “I know that they did not physically come up to our 
house and tie a belt around her neck . . . But when adults are involved 
and continue to screw with a thirteen-year-old—with or without 
mental problems—it is absolutely vile.”4  But while Drew and her 
employee’s actions may have pushed Meier over the edge, 
prosecutors struggled to charge Drew and her employee with a crime.   
In fact, the prosecutor’s legal theory against Drew was a result of 
a technicality, “unauthorized access.”5  Ultimately, prosecutors relied 
on a provision of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.6  Drew was 
charged because, by creating a fake profile, she violated MySpace’s 
Terms of Service.  However, a judge threw out the verdict and 
acquitted her of the three misdemeanor counts of which she had been 
convicted.7  Drew’s employee received immunity in exchange for her 
testimony against Drew.8  This case is a prime example of how the 
criminal courts are largely ineffective in cases involving cyberbullying. 
The Meier family could have brought a civil suit for injurious speech’ 
on the theory that Drew’s speech, through MySpace, caused them 
severe emotional distress.  Thus, the question remains: Why didn’t 
the Meier family pursue civil remedies? 
2. LARRY DOWNES, THE LAWS OF DISRUPTION: HARNESSING THE NEW FORCES
THAT GOVERN LIFE AND BUSINESS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 167 (2009). 
3. Id. at 168.
4. Lauren Collins, Friend Game: Behind the online hoax that led to a girl’s suicide,
NEW YORKER (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/01/21/ 
080121fa_fact_ collins#ixzz1XXTFNnXc. 
5. DOWNES, supra note 2, at 168.
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) provides that a 
person “who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [18 
U.S.C. § 1030(g)] may maintain a civil action against the violator to 
obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief . . .”9  The best 
scenario for the family would have been to use a conviction under the 
CFAA to seek a civil award.  Once the charges against Drew were 
thrown out, however, the Meier family may have decided against 
proceeding through the civil courts.  Another reason may be that the 
alleged tortfeasor, Drew, did not have money to compensate the 
Meier family. Even if the Meier’s had a strong case, neither the 
family, nor its attorney, would be adequately compensated.10  If this 
were the situation, an attorney may have declined to represent the 
family on a contingency basis, despite the media attention the 
incident received.  It is also possible that the Meier family did not 
have the means to pay an attorney for the costs associated with 
bringing a civil lawsuit.  Moreover, the Meier family may have had 
difficulty proving causation, which author Alison Virginia King cites 
as a major challenge in tort law.11  Here, the “boy’s” statements may 
have been extremely hurtful, but they may not amount to having 
caused Meier’s death. 
To address cyberbullying in cases such as Meier’s, California 
Congresswoman Linda Sanchez introduced. House of 
Representatives Bill 1966, the “Megan Meier Cyberbullying 
Prevention Act” in 2009.12  The main thrust of the bill is that if 
someone uses the internet to cause “substantial emotional distress” to 
another person, they could be fined or sent to prison.13  The proposed 
statute also discusses the psychological toll of cyberbullying.  In 
addition to causing depression and bringing down a student’s grades, 
cyberbullying can “in some cases lead to extreme violent behavior, 
including murder and suicide.”14  The bill’s legislative text cites 
research on  how common cyberbullying can be; more than half of 
mental health professionals had at least one client with a negative 
online experience, and most of these clients were minors.15  The bill 
9. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 456 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
10. Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 853 
(2010). 
11. Id.
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did not specify to what degree the online experience was negative. 
For example, if two students got into a political argument online and 
were upset over it, it likely would not qualify as “cyberbullying,” 
because even if it did cause distress, it would cross over into core 
freedom of speech territory.  While the protection of children, a 
particularly vulnerable population, is an important factor in 
considering injurious speech in the digital age, it is also important to 
balance the values served by the First Amendment.  Thus, would the 
proposed statute, by essentially criminalizing injurious speech, go too 
far in impinging on free speech protections in the digital sphere? 
Injurious speech on the Internet poses some interesting issues. 
First of all, the speaker can remain anonymous or create a false 
identity when posting statements online.  Anonymity may remove 
social barriers to writing hurtful language.  As in the Megan Meier 
case, one can pose as someone else to impact the recipient of the 
messages to a greater degree.  Moreover, there are only minimal 
transaction costs to posting content online, and posting a statement 
on the web or sending a message to a specific recipient is 
instantaneous.  Once the statements appear online, they have a global 
reach, meaning the potential damage has a much wider scope.  In fact, 
the speech could cause harm to people that the defendant has never 
known and did not intend to reach.  Thus, the Internet permits the 
harm to extend further than other, more traditional media, raising 
international jurisdictional issues, for example, in countries without 
an equivalent to the First Amendment.  I have chosen, however, to 
focus this paper on both injurious speech on the Internet originating 
from the United States, and on those from the U.S. who claim to be 
injured by the speech. 
The Megan Meier case is an example of an unsuccessful attempt 
to use the criminal courts as a forum to hold the alleged perpetrator 
accountable.  Thus, it would be most effective to consider a line of 
cases that address injurious speech, an area of law that may inform 
future cyberbullying-related cases.  While the Megan Meier case was 
a criminal case, this paper focuses exclusively on civil cases, where 
injurious speech is grounds for tort liability.  Another reason why it is 
important to begin a discussion of injurious speech with a case such as 
Meier’s, is that while it is an especially sympathetic case in favor of 
cracking down on potentially injurious speech, it is noteworthy that 
even the judge stated that “there is nothing in the legislative history 
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of the CFAA which suggests that Congress ever envisioned . . . 
application of the statute [to cyberbullying].”16 
But the question remains: Is the terrain of the digital world 
already adequately covered by the territory of injurious speech cases? 
This paper will examine relevant injurious speech case law in the 
more traditional media of print and broadcast in cases such as Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,17 Herceg v. Hustler,18 Winter v. G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons,19 Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Company,20 
Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.,21 Braun v. Soldier of Fortune,22 and 
Rice v. Paladin.23  These cases balance the interest in protecting 
victims who suffer emotional or physical harm with First Amendment 
free speech concerns, providing the lessons that apply to the digital 
world in the form of injurious speech on the Internet.  Cyberbullying 
is one example, but we will see how many of the publications or 
broadcasts easily could have been featured online.  This paper 
explores injurious speech cases involving broadcast or print media, 
and analyzes the following issues: (1) Can a public figure sue the press 
for intentionally inflicting emotional distress?  (2) Does parody have 
special First Amendment status?  (3) And finally, if a person is 
physically injured as a result of reading published information, may 
he or she sue the publisher for damages? 
I contend that a “notice and takedown” regime would mitigate 
the effects of cyberbullying while not overly infringing on the 
publisher’s First Amendment rights. 
II. Emotional Injury
If the First Amendment will protect a scumbag like me, it will 
protect all of you.24 
–Larry Flynt, played by Woody Harrelson
in the movie, The People vs.  Larry Flynt
16. King, supra note 10, at 857.
17. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
18. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
19. 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
20. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
21. 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
22. 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992).
23. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
24. THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT (Columbia Pictures 1996).
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The film, The People vs. Larry Flynt, cinematically re-created the 
events surrounding the Hustler case, which arose out of a Hustler 
Magazine parody of advertisements for the alcoholic drink, Campari. 
The real Campari advertisements featured a double entendre of 
celebrities discussing their “first time,” seemingly at first to describe 
their first time engaging in sexual relations, but actually referring to 
the first time trying the drink.  Hustler magazine’s Campari ad 
parody, titled “Jerry Falwell talks about his first time,” had the 
double entendre of discussing the fabricated first times that Falwell, a 
prominent Evangelical minister of national fame, both had tried 
Campari, and had sexual relations.25  But Falwell’s fictitious first 
sexual encounter was especially crude, described as being with his 
mother in an outhouse: “I [Falwell] never really expected to make it 
with Mom, but then after she showed all the other guys in town such a 
good time, I figured ‘what the hell!’”26  Although there was a 
disclaimer on the page that stated, “ad parody—not to be taken 
seriously,”27 Falwell did take the matter quite seriously.  He sued 
Hustler Magazine’s publisher Larry Flynt in a case which reached the 
Supreme Court. 
The case addressed the issue of whether a public figure can sue 
the press for intentional infliction of emotional distress.  One could 
argue, as Falwell did, that Hustler’s “caricature” of Falwell 
fundamentally differs from the political cartoons that satirize 
government officials and elevate political discourse.  However, the 
Court held that it would be one thing if there was a truly effective way 
of always correctly distinguishing between both—but there is not. 
“Outrageousness,” the Court noted, is subjective, and it would likely 
chill free speech if it were up to jurors to decide which speech should 
be penalized.28  Thus, parody has special First Amendment status. 
Unpopular speech is inherently more likely to irk jurors, but it is 
precisely the type of speech the First Amendment should protect.29  
The Court invoked the principles behind the First Amendment: the 
ability to have intense debates about political issues and people who 
take a prominent role in government or societal conduct.  Political 
debate is bound to lead to criticism of public figures who, by the very 
nature of their fame, shape events.  As in defamation cases, if a public 
25. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
26. Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of
Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 428 (1988). 
27. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 48.
28. Id. at 55.
29. Id. at 57.
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figure or public official is negatively portrayed, he can utilize his 
access to the media to clear his name.30  While the Supreme Court 
referred to the ad parody as “offensive” to Falwell and “gross and 
repugnant in the eyes of most,”31 the Court refused to deny it the First 
Amendment’s protection. 
In Hustler, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
prevents damage awards to public figures to compensate for 
emotional distress.  “Mr. Flynt’s victory . . . prevented plaintiffs from 
doing an end run around the First Amendment by claiming they 
suffered ‘emotional distress.”’32  In other words, even though the 
speech was “patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional 
injury,” the First Amendment protected the speech, since it could not 
“reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the 
public figure involved.”33  As decided in N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,34 
if indeed the statement was a false statement of fact that met the 
actual malice standard, Falwell could sue under libel to seek 
compensation for injury to his reputation.  
The holding in Hustler certainly translates well to injurious speech 
on the web.  Unlike Meier, who was a private figure, Falwell had an 
established reputation.  As a result of Hustler, if someone publishes 
offensive material online with the intent to cause a public figure 
emotional distress, but the public knows that the material did not 
state actual facts about that person, as in the case of a parody, the 
public figure cannot receive damages.  One of the First Amendment’s 
gifts is that it protects individuals’ ability to criticize those who have 
clout, whether their forum is YouTube or the pulpit.  Even if the 
criticism is crude or in poor taste, it is still protected speech, whether 
in print or on the Internet.  Hustler Magazine’s ad parody would 
likely appear online if its publication were to occur today, and the 
outcome of the case would be the same.  Regardless of the fact that 
Falwell may have suffered emotional distress as a result of the 
injurious speech, one would certainly realize the satirical efforts 
illustrated by the contrast between Falwell’s public image as a 
minister and the ad’s placement, had it been on Hustler Magazine’s 
website. 
30. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 304–05 (1964).
31. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
32. Gloria Steinem, Op-Ed, Hollywood Cleans Up Hustler, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1997
available at http://www.feminist.com/resources/artspeech/media/flynt.htm.. 
33. Hustler, 485 U.S. at 50.
34. Id.
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Another case involving Hustler Magazine led not to emotional 
injury, but a physical injury so serious it resulted in death.  Diane 
Herceg sued the magazine for the death of her 14-year-old son, Troy 
D., who had experimented with autoerotic asphyxiation after reading 
about it in an article, titled “Orgasm of Death.”35  The issue in Herceg 
was whether the magazine article’s language amounted to incitement 
to “attempt a potentially fatal act.”36  The court mentioned types of 
speech that do not have full First Amendment protection: “obscene 
materials, child pornography, fighting words, incitement of imminent 
lawless activity, and purposefully-made or recklessly-made false 
statements of fact such as libel, defamation, or fraud.”37  The only 
category that the court considered in Herceg from the 
aforementioned list is “incitement of imminent lawless activity.”  In 
that situation, the article would  not be protected under the First 
Amendment, and its text could render the magazine liable for the 
emotional and psychological injury to the boy’s parents as the result 
of his death. 
However, the court stated the article in Hustler did not fit any of 
these categories.  In addition, the court decided that the article did 
not even amount to advocacy of autoerotic asphyxiation, given that it 
included a medical description of why it is a life-threatening practice 
and “the seriousness of the danger of harm.”38  Moreover, even 
advocacy, as opposed to incitement, is protected under the First 
Amendment.  To further understand what “incitement” really is, it is 
helpful to consider the court’s example, which it quoted from Noto v. 
United States: “the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety 
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the 
same as preparing a group for violent action and steering it to such 
action.”39  Thus, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of 
Hustler Magazine and against the mother of the boy.  “The 
constitutional protection accorded to the freedom of speech and of 
the press is not based on the naïve belief that speech can do no harm 
but on the confidence that the benefits society reaps from the free 
35. Brian Graifman, The Judge Not Chosen and the Hustler Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1990, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/08/17/opinion/l-the-judge-not-chosen-and-
hustler-case-528190.html. 
36. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987).
37. Id.at 1020.
38. Id. at 1023.
39. Id. (quoting 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
 
2011] ADDING INJURY TO INSULT 9
flow and exchange of ideas outweigh the costs society endures by 
receiving reprehensible or dangerous ideas.”40 
The lessons from this case apply to injurious speech on the web. 
First of all, Hustler Magazine is available online, and the article could 
have easily been featured there.  Punishing the magazine because of 
how a person acted after reading the article could have a chilling 
effect on speech in the future: “If the shield of the First Amendment 
can be eliminated by proving after publication that an article 
discussing a dangerous idea negligently helped bring about a real 
injury simply because the idea can be identified as ‘bad,’ all free 
speech can be threatened.”41  Moreover, even if a magazine is 
restricted to those over 18 years of age, it may be even easier for 
those in a younger age group to access it online than in person, since 
the Internet allows for greater anonymity in transactions.  In addition, 
a lot of articles online allow readers to post comments.  The article 
may strongly advocate against autoerotic asphyxiation, but what if the 
readers write messages extolling the practice?  Should the magazine 
be held accountable because of the readers’ statements?  However, 
there are counterarguments.  It seems that if the purpose of the article 
was to educate about a type of sexual arousal, but just as much to 
caution against it, perhaps such an activity should not be featured in a 
magazine that caters to people preoccupied enough with sex to the 
point they spend money on a magazine dealing with such topics. 
Moreover, one could argue that if the article’s purpose was as 
previously articulated, then Hustler likely included “unnecessary 
detail.”42  For example, the dissent mentioned there were detailed 
descriptions of how to engage in the practice, more than just the basic 
information.  Also, instead of the cautionary warnings in the article 
being a deterrent to the practice, they were likely even more enticing 
to the readers, who may think of any potential risks as adding another 
layer of thrill.  While these are noteworthy points, they fail to give 
strong support for classifying the article in an unprotected speech 
category, in print or online.  Publishing an online article, even with 
salacious details about this sexual activity, is much different than 
providing the young man with the rope and directly helping him hang 
himself.  While society does have an interest in protecting teenagers 
like Troy, holding Hustler civilly liable for its words may create 
40. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1119.
41. Id. at 1024.
42. MARC A. FRANKLIN, DAVID A. ANDERSON, LIDSKY & LYRISSA BARNETT,
MASS MEDIA LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 445 (7th ed. 2005). 
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ambiguous standards which would prevent magazines in print, and 
now increasingly more online, from disseminating valuable 
information to the public.  These unclear guidelines would end up 
creating a chilling effect on the First Amendment because authors 
would be overly cautious of what they publish.43  Perhaps some people 
who read the Hustler article on the web may have been deterred from 
the practice because the article described the consequences of 
participation.  This article could have also saved a life, and its 
publication on Hustler’s website could have targeted precisely the 
people that would need to hear about these risks. 
III. Physical Injury
In Winter, mushroom enthusiasts relied on a book’s information, 
became sick from eating unsafe mushrooms, and subsequently 
brought suit against the publisher.44  Two people purchased The 
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, a book that provided information about 
picking and cooking mushrooms, among them wild mushrooms.  But 
after the two people ate the mushrooms, they became so ill that they 
required liver transplants.  They brought products liability  claims 
against the publisher.  More specifically, the court used a strict 
liability theory, which involves finding a defendant liable without a 
finding of culpability, such as intent.  The court, however, did not 
agree to expand the doctrine of strict liability to realms outside of 
tangible items.  The tangible part of the book itself, its cover, binding, 
or its pages did not harm the plaintiffs in the case.  It was the content 
of the pages, the information provided in the text, which arguably 
caused harm when the two people relied on it.  It would be a 
dangerous suppression of free speech for courts to regulate content 
through strict liability theory: “[w]e accept the risk that words and 
ideas have wings we cannot clip and which carry them we know not 
where.”45  If the content of books were subject to strict liability, where 
would courts draw the line? 
Authors would surely be more hesitant to write if they knew their 
words could be used against them.  No publisher would want to 
finance “how-to” books if there were litigation risks associated with 
the genre.  For example, would any author write a book about 
learning how to ride a bike if they would be subject to liability any 
time someone was injured while trying to learn?  Moreover, would a 
43. Id.
44. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991).
45. Id. at 1035.
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cookbook publisher finance a cookbook if it were subject to liability if 
a reader, while following a recipe, was burned because he touched a 
pan that was too hot?  These examples mirror an actual court case 
where a student sued a textbook publisher because he was injured 
doing a science project described in the textbook.46  But had Winter 
been decided otherwise, we might jeopardize the publication of 
science textbooks out of an aversion to defending a lawsuit. 
The publisher prevailed because the court said it had no duty to 
investigate the accuracy of contents of the book it published.  In fact, 
the court was so wary of imposing a duty to investigate on the 
publisher, that it was unwilling to require the publisher to give a 
warning saying, “the information in the book is not complete,” or 
“the consumer may not fully rely on it,” or “this publisher has not 
investigated the text and cannot guarantee its accuracy.”47  With 
regards to the first warning, the court said that the warning would 
force a publisher to investigate the contents of the book, precisely 
what it did not want the publisher to do.  With regards to the last 
warning, the court said it was “unnecessary given that no publisher 
has a duty as a guarantor.”48  Although two people became 
dangerously ill in the shortterm as a result of relying on the book’s 
information, the court was more concerned with the long-term health 
of free speech.  “The threat of liability without fault (financial 
responsibility for our words and ideas in the absence of fault or a 
special undertaking or responsibility) could seriously inhibit those 
who wish to share thoughts and theories’”49 
The Winter ruling has implications for injurious speech on the 
Internet.  Winter involved a publisher facilitating the spread of “ideas 
and information to the public,”50 which is what Wikipedia and other 
encyclopedic resources do via the Internet.  Much of the value that 
the Internet offers is quick access to information that can generally be 
relied upon in making a basic determination, like whether a snake is 
poisonous.  But even if information comes from a verifiable source, 
such as a Center for Disease Control website with information about 
snakes, a person must be careful, because after all, they could be 
handling a poisonous snake.  Surely the Internet would lose much of 
its robust information sharing properties if, for example, the federal 
46. Id. (citing Walter v. Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 823 (Sup. Ct. 1981)).
47. Winter, 938 F.2d at 1035.
48. Id. at 1038.
49. Id. at 1035.
50. Id. at 1037 n.8.
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government would have to pay if someone got sick from a snake bite. 
Is it not better to have such guides available, even if occasionally 
there is one that needs to be revised?  The publication’s reach on the 
web would likely even be larger than its publication in print, so a 
publisher that has content online could face tremendous liability.  The 
publisher might do a cost-benefit calculation and stay away from 
providing advice that could possibly lead to injurious outcomes.  One 
way to perhaps guarantee further accuracy would be to require 
extensive fact checking, but this process would be resource intensive. 
Books in print or online would take too long to be published and 
would be too costly for anyone to actually purchase, and hence, use. 
Implied in Winter is a lesson that applies to the Internet: it serves the 
public much better overall to be able to have access to more content, 
but the burden to investigate its accuracy should rest with the person 
who has the most at stake: the user.  After all, the First Amendment 
requires it. 
In Olivia,51 there was a copycat sexual assault following the 
broadcast of a television drama.  NBC broadcasted a movie, Born 
Innocent, which featured a scene where a group of girls attacked a 
young girl in the shower and forcibly used a plunger’s handle to 
“artificially rap[e]” her.52  After the movie’s broadcast, a group of 
boys attacked and “artificially raped” a nine-year-old girl with a 
bottle.53  These boys had seen and talked about that specific scene in 
the movie before committing the act.  The court declined to use the 
low-threshold negligence standard (i.e., asking whether NBC was 
negligent in showing the film).  Such a standard would surely stifle 
debates upon public issues that could normally be raised by films that 
may explore controversial content, and “reduce the U.S. adult 
population to viewing only what is fit for children.”54  Instead, the 
court said the more appropriate test was whether NBC’s broadcast 
incited the boys to act upon their victim.  In other words, did NBC, by 
showing the film, “advocate or encourage violent acts?”55 
What if Born Innocent had been shown online, instead of on 
television sets?  Olivia’s lessons are analogous to the issues facing the 
digital world, because television broadcasts posed ‘“unique and 
51. 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
52. Id. at 891.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 892.
55. Id.
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special problems’ that hadn’t existed in prior free speech cases,”56 in 
the same way that the digital world does today.  The First 
Amendment ensures that government does not have the power to 
curtail “expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, 
or its content.”57  As applied to electronic media, “the First 
Amendment means that it is the broadcaster that has the authority to 
make programming decisions.”58  The court stated that using a 
negligence theory in such cases would result in holding television 
stations liable if, for example, a child copied behavior shown on a 
news program.59  In other words, news shows might be prevented 
from describing a murder that happened in a neighborhood in order 
to prevent a person from repeating the same crime.  Since many of 
news videos are now featured online, this scenario extends to the 
digital world.  Born Innocent was a fictional movie, and it would be 
entirely unreasonable to hold a movie studio or television network 
liable if it streamed a movie or television show on the web with a 
violent scene that someone decided to emulate.  That would certainly 
exclude graphically violent films such as American History X, Silence 
of the Lambs, or Clockwork Orange.  It would also exclude films such 
as Saving Private Ryan, a similarly graphic film about World War II. 
The reason that movies such as the one in Olivia are given First 
Amendment protection, according to the court, is to ensure “the free 
flow from creator to audience of whatever message a film or a book 
might convey,”60 because otherwise they would censor themselves.  In 
fact, the court was so concerned with the specter of potentially 
censoring a program’s content that it would not allow doing so, even 
if the restriction was designed to protect a child.61  The court even 
goes so far as to say that a television network would be more wary of 
having to pay a damage award than facing a criminal penalty.62  The 
California Court of Appeal stated that the way to deter a copycat 
rape based on a television broadcast is not to censor the program, but 
rather to promote education and punish the party responsible for 
committing the crime.63 
56. Id. at 891.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 892.
60. Id. at 891.
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Just like the Internet has a wide and instantaneous reach, so does 
the radio, albeit on a smaller scale.  In Weirum,64 a radio host at a 
station with a large teenage following drove a radio van around the 
Los Angeles area for a contest in which whoever found him first 
would win money.65  A teenager driving in pursuit of the radio 
personality negligently ran another driver off the road and killed 
him.66  The issue in the case was whether the radio station owed the 
decedent a duty of due care.67  The California Supreme Court held 
that the Los Angeles radio station was liable for the wrongful death 
of the driver.  But why hold the broadcaster at fault?  After all, the 
driver caused the accident.  The court reasoned, however, that the 
teenagers’ “reckless conduct was stimulated by the radio station’s 
broadcast.”68  In other words, the broadcaster “was urging listeners to 
act in an inherently dangerous manner.”69 
The judge, however, narrowed the scope of the ruling so as not to 
impinge on free speech protections.  “[The contest] was a competitive 
scramble in which the thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor 
was intensified by the live broadcasts which accompanied the 
pursuit.”70  It is evident the contest was designed to have drivers rush 
on the streets, so much so that they would speed past the other 
drivers also on the chase.  “The issue here is civil accountability for 
the foreseeable results of a broadcast which created an undue risk of 
harm to decedent.”71  This was an invitation to act, to put speed as a 
first priority on the road.  In fact one would be rewarded by being 
able to appear on the radio and with a monetary prize.  Moreover, 
although the contest was a limited-time-only promotion, the contest 
was promoted throughout the evening and thus “actively and 
repeatedly encouraged listeners to speed to announced locations.”72  
In contrast, the scene in Born Innocent in the Olivia case certainly did 
not “invite” viewers in any way to use an object such as a plunger 
handle to sexually assault a young girl. 
Weirum affects injurious speech online in several ways.  First of 
all, radio stations stream their broadcasts online, making it possible 
64. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 37 (Cal. 1975).
65. Id.
66. Olivia, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
67. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 38.
68. Olivia, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
69. Id.
70. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 41.
71. Id. at 47.
72. Olivia, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
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for drivers on the road to listen via a digital device, such as a smart 
phone.  The crucial difference is, with the Internet, even more people 
can listen, regardless of whether they are outside the traditional 
coverage area.  Moreover, many promotions involve sending a text 
message with a specific code to a phone number, encouraging the 
kind of risky behavior at issue in Weirum.  Just as in Weirum, many 
radio promotions are very time sensitive, and hosts tend to emphasize 
the urgency in much the same way today as they did in Weirum.  The 
problem is that many listeners are still listening to the radio when 
they are in their car.73  After all, gone are the days when families 
would sit around the radio to listen to the broadcasts.  Some radio 
promotions may encourage multitasking on the road.  The National 
Safety Council released a study stating that cell phone calls or text 
messages account for almost thirty percent of traffic accidents.74  
AAA mentioned studies that state that texting increases a driver’s 
chance of being in an accident eightfold.75  It certainly is foreseeable 
that calling in to a radio show while driving, or texting while 
navigating through traffic, could lead to more reckless driving.  These 
are the same concerns the court had in Weirum, although concerning 
different technology.  Cell phone use while driving already poses 
substantial risks and the radio promotions that integrate such digital 
devices, only work to heighten these risks.  Given the National Safety 
Council’s statistic, the relevance of the foreseeability prong as it 
relates to accidents, like the one in Weirum, becomes clear. 
IV. Not Fit to Print: Injurious Speech and Printed Media
In Winter, two people followed the instructions of a mushroom
encyclopedia and became dangerously ill, but could not prove the 
publisher liable for the content upon which they relied.  In Rice, 
however, the publisher of a Hit Man book was found liable for 
causing the deaths of three people killed by a contract murderer.76  
The killer not only used a large number of instructions described in 
the book, but also followed the methods identically in his 
73. Arbitron Study, The Road Ahead Media and Entertainment in the Car, slide 38,
http://www.arbitron.com/downloads/The_Road_Ahead_2011.pdf. 
74. Ashley Halsey III, 28 Percent of Accidents Involve Talking, Texting on
Cellphones, WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
content/article/2010/01/12/AR2010011202218.html. 
75. Automobile Association of America, In the Driver’s Seat: New Auto Club Study
Shows Texting While Driving Is On the Rise (April 27, 2010) (on file with Hastings 
Communications and Entertainment Law Journal). 
76. Rice v. Paladin Enter., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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perpetration of the crime.  The man hired a contract killer, James 
Perry, to kill his ex-wife, his eight-year-old quadriplegic son, and the 
son’s nurse.77  The purpose of the killing was for the man to be able to 
collect the $2 million dollar settlement that had been awarded the boy 
as a result of his injuries.  The court held that the book did not 
contain speech protected by the First Amendment.  The book 
included specific instructions on creating a murder weapon, executing 
the murder, and techniques to disguise the cause of death: 
Using your six inch, serrated blade knife, stab deeply into the 
side of the victim’s neck and push the knife forward in a 
forceful movement.  An ice pick can . . . be driven into the 
victim’s brain, through the ear, after he has been subdued. 
The wound hardly bleeds at all, and death is sometimes 
attributed to natural causes.78 
The publisher’s wrongdoing here is hardly clearcut.  According to 
Winter and Braun, a publisher is not required to investigate the 
contents of what he prints.  However, Paladin Press “stipulated that it 
specifically targeted the market of murderers, would-be murderers, 
and other criminals for sale of its murder manual.”79  Paladin admitted 
that it catered to people that would actually act upon the descriptive 
instructions in the text.  “Paladin has stipulated both that it had 
knowledge and that it intended that Hit Man would immediately be 
used by criminals and would-be criminals in the solicitation, planning, 
and commission of murder and murder for hire.”80  The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted there was not even a shred of 
material that contained any information that championed the values 
of free speech that the First Amendment celebrates.  Rather, the text 
in the 130-page book was more like a set of specific steps instructing 
potential criminals how to get ready for, perpetrate, and conceal a 
murder.81  Furthermore, the book was not merely a set of dry 
instructions; it actually allayed concerns that one considering 
committing murder might have, such as how they would feel after 
committing the act.82  The text made these people feel better about 
77. Id. at 239.
78. Id. at 236–37.
79. Id. at 266.
80. Id. at 248.
81. Id. at 256.
82. Id. at 252.
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going through with their intentions.83  And Paladin stipulated that, 
through publishing and selling Hit Man, it ‘assisted’ Perry in the 
perpetration of the brutal triple murders.84  It was precisely the book’s 
content, coupled with Paladin’s stark and comprehensive stipulations, 
which in the court’s words, were an “almost taunting defiance”85 that 
fueled the court to have rule against Paladin and for Rice with no 
hesitation. 
However, broadcasters and other publishers joined in support of 
Paladin, arguing that holding a publisher civilly liable for the acts of a 
third party would conflict with the First Amendment.86  This, they 
argued, could subject any magazine, book or film to liability.  The 
concern was articulated further by saying that anytime someone 
watches a news report, for example, the broadcaster would be 
worried about a copycat crime, and surely it would be unreasonable 
for the nightly news to stop reporting on murders.  The court, 
however, effectively distinguished the present case:  
In the ‘copycat’ context, it will presumably never be the case 
that the broadcaster or publisher actually intends, through its 
description or depiction, to assist another or others in the 
commission of violent crime; rather, the information for the 
dissemination of which liability is sought to be imposed will 
actually have been misused vis-à-vis the use intended, not, as 
here, used precisely as intended.87 
The court also mentioned that in most cases there will not be such 
strong evidence in addition to the text itself, such as in the present 
case, where the publisher admits to having purposefully sold the text 
to help others commit a crime, “aid[ing] and abet[ting] murder.”88  
The court stated that even if a movie glamorizes murder, the fact it 
was a Hollywood blockbuster film shows it was intended to entertain 
and thus earn the studio a big profit.89  For example, a movie such as 
Kill Bill: Vol. 1 shows that the movie studio, Miramax Films, had not 
intended it to make it easier for someone to kill another person. 
Miramax is clearly not intending to enable murderers.  The purpose 
83. Id.
84. Id. at 267.
85. Id. at 265.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 266.
89. Id. at 265.
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of the film has never been touted as anything other than 
entertainment, as distinguished from Rice where the publisher 
admitted its book was designed to help make the kill. 
Moreover, in a news report, the journalist’s purpose is to educate 
the community, not to make it easier for someone to repeat the crime, 
as the book Hit Man did.90  Paladin ended up settling out of court, and 
in addition to paying the family money, the publisher agreed to 
destroy remaining copies of the book.91  While the idea of banning 
books seems to be reminiscent of Ray Bradbury’s book Fahrenheit 
451, a manual created to help someone complete a murder and cover 
their tracks seems pretty clearly against the public interest.   
Rice’s ruling certainly applies to injurious speech on the Internet. 
In the age of global terrorism, if someone distributes a manual on 
evading airport security and causing massive death through a terrorist 
attack, and the publisher of such an online manual were to admit that 
was his purpose, he should have to pay for any damage they cause if 
someone follows the instructions and is successful.  One of the more 
dangerous aspects of Internet writings is the publisher’s ability to 
spread such information for a very small transaction cost, and a 
general inability to stop the spread of such harmful information.  The 
only way to hold these publishers accountable would be under Rice, 
requiring a plaintiff to prove, via stipulation or otherwise, that the 
publisher’s intent was to create a terrorist attack and that the work 
was marketed for that purpose.  Admittedly, in the Hit Man book 
there were warnings that said “for academic study only!”92  But given 
the context of the publisher’s statements that the book was intended 
to help others kill, the court argues that the warnings were used to 
make it seem even more realistic that if the person followed the 
instructions, they would be able to commit a dangerous act. 
Otherwise, why would they need to warn the reader not to do it? 
This point relates well to the Internet because it is easy for a website 
operator to require the writer of online manuals to write “do not 
attempt” on the website of the previous terrorism example, but any 
such requirement is likely negated by the extreme specificity with 
which the procedures are described.  Certainly a few words in a 
disclaimer will not cancel out the many words that follow that appear 
to advocate otherwise.  Were Hit Man published online merely to 
90. Id. at 266.
91. David G. Savage, Publisher of ‘Hit Man’ Manual Agrees to Settle Suit Over Triple
Slaying, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 1999, at A10. 
92. Rice, 128 F.3d at 254.
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glorify the killing of another human being, suppressing it would be a 
violation of freedom of speech.  But the fact that it was a step-by-step 
instruction manual and the publisher’s intent was to help others kill, 
its suppression likely saved lives. 
The issue of injurious speech does not only arise in a publication’s 
articles, but also in its advertisements.  In Braun,93 a magazine was 
found liable for an advertisement in its classified section.  The “Gun 
for Hire” ad was for a contract killer, Michael Savage, who was 
seeking employment: 
GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary desires 
jobs. Vietnam Veteran. Discrete [sic] and very private. Body 
guard, courier, and other special skills. All jobs 
considered. . . 94 
Someone took Savage’s offer seriously.  In 1985, Bruce Gastwirth 
enlisted Savage’s services to kill Gastwirth’s business partner, 
Richard Braun.95  Braun’s son filed a civil suit against the gun 
magazine that published the ad, Soldier of Fortune, and its publishing 
company for his injuries and the wrongful death of his father.96  
Braun’s son suffered emotional injury from witnessing Savage’s 
associate kill his father, as well as physical harm from the attack.97  
Given that the court was considering holding a publisher liable, the 
court wanted to guard against a potential chilling effect that could 
occur: a publisher may engage in self-censorship if the law imposed 
too much of a burden on publishers about ads they feature in their 
magazine.  To ensure that the ruling would compensate the victim 
and at the same time not chill speech, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals used a balancing test to see whether the likelihood the harm 
would occur multiplied by the harm’s severity would outweigh the 
defendant’s burden in taking safety precautions.98  Moreover the court 
affirmed the district court’s test that the First Amendment allows “a 
state to impose liability on a publisher for negligently publishing a 
commercial advertisement where the ad on its face, and without the 
need for investigation, makes it apparent that there is a substantial 
93. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, 968 F.2d 1110, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992).




98. Id. at 1115.
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danger of harm to the public.”99  For example, the court notes that the 
ad used language such as “gun for hire” and not only left open what 
the gun would be hired for, but also intentionally used broad 
language on two occasions, such as “other special skills” and “all jobs 
considered,” which the court interpreted as including jobs that are 
unlawful.100  While the ad does not say, “I can be hired to kill people,” 
or “I have the skills and equipment necessary to kill someone, so 
please hire me to do so,” the court stated that it was easy enough to 
interpret that Savage could be hired to kill people, because that’s 
certainly how Gastwirth read it.101 
While the First Amendment protects commercial speech, which 
facilitates informed decision-making about financial matters, the First 
Amendment does not protect commercial speech that involves 
breaking the law, such as a wanted ad for the purchase of drugs.102  
Just like in Winter, the court Braun found that the publisher had no 
duty to investigate.  Although Braun held the publisher and magazine 
liable, the result is entirely consistent with Winter because the 
magazine in Braun still had no duty to investigate the ads.  In fact, 
Braun’s point is that the publisher does not need to investigate 
because they will only be liable for an injury-causing ad when the 
danger is apparent.103  Thus, the reason that it comports with the First 
Amendment is twofold: The fact that a publisher has no duty to 
investigate and the requirement that the information in the ad must 
clearly cause “substantial” public danger. 
This fits nicely within the digital landscape because injurious 
speech may arise in an online advertisement.  The Braun ruling is 
especially relevant because virtually all magazines and newspapers 
are publishing online.  For example, a magazine that also publishes 
online could have an ad that comes up in a pop-up or side-bar.  In 
fact, such advertising is the main way that magazines and newspapers 
stay profitable online if they are not charging readers for 
subscriptions.  The dissent in Braun, however, raised a 
counterargument relating to the Internet: Not all ad spaces are 
alike—there are billboard type advertisement spaces or the classified 
section where the publisher may have less of a role. 
99. Id. at 1119.
100. Id. at 1121.
101. Id. at 1112.
102. Id. at 1117.
103. Id. at 1118–19.
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Despite the publisher’s low burden and lack of duty to investigate, 
it is still possible a publisher may be liable for what it prints. 
Moreover, the focus here is on websites for more traditional 
publications, such as Time Magazine, which on their web site’s 
homepage has a section that says “sponsored links.”104  The Braun 
ruling should certainly not create too tough a burden for a publication 
on a website.  If the publisher does not have enough sensibility to 
know when an ad makes an offer to commit a “serious violent 
crime,”105 then they probably should not be in the information 
gathering business.  We want to “chill” murder, so that both the gun 
for hire and the client will have a harder time achieving their goals. 
That is certainly applicable online, where a user can use a cloak of 
anonymity with less fear they will get caught. 
This case exemplifies how, when it comes to private victims, 
courts may theoretically be able to draw a clear “content” line 
between bullying speech that is offensive but protected and bullying 
speech that is actionable despite the First Amendment.  Practically, 
however, the courts have a very difficult time making the distinctions 
in a way that would not chill free speech.  Even in Rice, while the 
court held the publisher liable for a book’s injurious speech, the court 
noted such a case was very rare because the publisher admitted it sold 
the book to help others commit murder.106  Moreover, the court stated 
the entire book was injurious speech.  While it is true that defamation 
cases involving private figures seem to allow legal actions against a 
relatively wide range of speech, this paper does not address the tort of 
defamation, which is not protected by the First Amendment.  The 
interesting challenge that injurious speech poses, and the reason it is 
the exclusive focus of this paper, is that it addresses the tensions 
involved between holding a party responsible for causing injury and 
affirming First Amendment protections.  Importantly, while 
cyberbullying may include “hate speech,” this paper does not focus 
on injurious speech targeted at a protected group or at an individual 
because they are a member of a protected group.  Rather, this paper 
focuses on injurious speech that can cause injury regardless of one’s 
gender, race or religion. 
104. TIME, http://www.time.com/time/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
105. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119.
106. Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 266 (4th Cir. 1997).
 
22 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [34:1
V. Proposal: Applying Staturory “Safe Harbors” to
Injurious Speech 
In 1995, an unaired episode of The Jenny Jones Show garnered 
national media attention.  In front of a studio audience, a homosexual 
man, Scott Amedure, confessed his secret affection for his 
heterosexual friend, Jonathan Schmitz.107  Three days after the show’s 
taping, Schmitz killed Amedure and was subsequently convicted of 
second-degree murder.  Amedure’s family sued The Jenny Jones 
Show producers,108 claiming that they should have known about 
Schmitz’s mental illness.  Surely being confronted with such a surprise 
could be traumatic for a person, especially when the announcement is 
televised.  Schmitz’s mental illness may have only exacerbated the 
situation.  It was precisely the effect of Amedure’s statements that 
prompted Schmitz to act, leading to Amedure’s injury and death. 
The show maintained that producers are not responsible for guests’ 
safety after they have left the studio.  The issue of vicarious or 
contributory liability for a TV station, book publisher, or Internet site 
is thus very relevant. 
Efforts to create statutory “safe harbors” from secondary liability, 
as in vicarious or contributory liability similarly could be applied to 
digital injurious speech.  An example of this in the area of copyright 
infringement is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(“DMCA”).  The DMCA’s Title II establishes a “safe harbor” for 
Internet service providers (“ISPs”), basically shielding them from 
liability for copyright violations, if they adhere to certain 
requirements.  Namely, if a copyright holder notifies the ISP, they 
must quickly prevent others from accessing the allegedly infringing 
material.109 
DMCA “safe harbor” provisions could extend protection to 
certain entities facing vicarious or contributory liability for injurious 
speech torts if they satisfied similar requirements.  Under such a legal 
regime, an ISP would not be held liable for hosting a website that 
features actionable injurious speech.  For example, in a situation 
where a group of teenagers sling insults at each other on Facebook, 
the “notice and take down” rule for ISPs would only take effect if the 
speech truly amounted injurious speech, which as we have seen in the 
case law, is a very high threshold.  The take down orders would likely 
107. Michelle Green, TV’s Fatal Attraction, PEOPLE (Mar. 27, 1995), available at
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20105369,00.html. 
108. Graves v. Warner Bros., 656 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
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not become weapons against expression because, as we have seen in 
Weirum, speech becomes injurious only when it is the “foreseeable 
result” of a situation that creates an “undue risk of harm.”110  In his 
book, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, Jonathan Zittrain 
argues that the “notice and take down approach” effectively balances 
competing concerns of removing content while not impinging on 
freedom of speech.111  Zittrain provides the example of the Internet 
hosting site, Geocities, which should be able to host a home page 
without fear of liability for the content on the page, as long as it 
blocked and removed the content once it was notified of a violation.112 
This framework allowed free expression on the Internet to 
continue, and Zittrain argues that these personal home pages were 
precursors to what we know as “blogs” today.113  “Had these 
intermediaries stopped offering these services for fear of crushing 
liability under a different legal configuration, people would have had 
far fewer options to broadcast online: they could have either hosted 
content through their own personal PCs, with several incumbent 
shortcomings, or forgone broadcasting altogether.”114  On the other 
hand, one could argue that the ISP are in a great position to prevent 
the injurious speech.  After all, they could take acts that could reduce 
the likelihood and severity of bad outcomes.  Certainly they could do 
some of their own policing to avoid injurious speech, and it is 
especially bad press to have someone  injured as a result of an online 
radio broadcast.  If indeed a party is harmed by injurious speech 
online, who should bear the costs?   Should it be the injured party, or 
the party in the chain of benefit, such as the ISP?  The directly 
responsible party, for example the author of the injurious speech, 
could be penniless, so the injured party might prefer to sue the ISP. 
The anonymity of posters on the Internet creates another hurdle 
to holding culpable parties responsible.  Even if an individual had a 
strong injurious speech case, they might have a great deal of difficulty 
determining who deserves to be sued.  But in the search for the 
culpable party, we also don’t want to violate someone’s privacy.  Just 
like we might feel uncomfortable if a company always knew where we 
visited in the physical world, so too would we feel uncomfortable if a 
company knew where we visited in the virtual world. 
110. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975).
111. See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN,.THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP 
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Those who argue that the “notice and take down” provisions, like 
those in the DMCA, do too little too late, run headlong into problems 
with prior restraint.  Prior restraints to speech, “rather than punishing 
it after the fact if indeed it is unlawful”115 are presumed 
unconstitutional.116  “Notice and take down” provisions are not prior 
restraints and avoid this presumption. 
Just as the DMCA’s “safe harbor” provisions exonerate an ISP 
from liability for copyright infringement unless it is notified of the 
infringement, so too should ISPs not be held responsible for injurious 
speech that would subject the speaker to liability. 
VI. Conclusion
Virtually all newspapers and magazines publish online.  It seems 
that we are more networked than ever, with television news stories 
and programs streamed online, pervasive email communications, 
blogs, and social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, as well 
as movies and films being distributed via iTunes.  This frees speech 
even more, but it also makes the implications for injurious speech on 
the Internet have a wider scope.  In examining the following cases in 
print and broadcast, such as Hustler,117 Herceg,118 Winter,119 Olivia,120 
Weirum,121 Braun,122 and Rice,123 we have seen how courts have 
attempted to strike a balance between freedom of speech and 
expression and protecting people who suffer emotional or physical 
harm.  Moreover, I have tried to “link” each case to a digital 
discussion, so that we can fully relate the issues courts have faced in 
the past in order to understand their implications for the future. 
Indeed, with the proliferation of discussion with regards to 
cyberbullying, we have already seen this new framework in action. 
One could argue that we have criminal law to punish criminals, and 
making cyberbullying a crime poses too dangerous a risk to free 
speech.  Herceg, in ruling in favor of Hustler Magazine, recognized 
that the power of speech can have disastrous consequences at times, 
115. Zittrain, supra note 111.
116. Near v. Minn., 283 U.S. 697, 723 (1931).
117. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
118. Herceg v. Hustler, 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
119. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991).
120. Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Company, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981). 
121. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36 (Cal. 1975).
122. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992).
123. Rice v. Paladin, 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997).
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but it is a right worth protecting even in those cases.  Moreover, as the 
court articulated in Olivia, unless the injurious speech incites unlawful 
activity, a court will not hold the network civilly liable for their 
broadcast.  Even the book publisher in Winter, purporting itself to be 
a reliable source of information, caused two people to develop such 
serious health conditions as to require liver transplants, and was not 
held liable. 
At the same time, as the court ruled in Weirum, a broadcaster can 
be held liable if it motivates dangerous behavior.  Similarly, Braun 
held a publisher accountable for advertising a “hired gun” because 
the injurious effect of the speech in the ad was so clear, the publisher 
did not even need to investigate to detect the harm.  Sometimes, as in 
Rice, criminal law is not enough, and the publisher quite literally has 
to pay for its intentional facilitation of injurious speech, when it 
amounts to aiding and abetting a murder.  Judging by the case law, it 
looks like Sanchez’s “Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act” 
will face some obstacles to ensure it does not impermissibly restrict 
free speech.  Certainly it should be restricted to victims who are not 
public figures, lest it run afoul of the Hustler case, which ensured that 
the injurious speech would have to be interpreted as statement of fact 
and also be “extreme or outrageous.” 
While cyberbullying’s scope is not normally considered to apply 
to public figures, the proposed statute, if it would pass First 
Amendment constitutional muster, should nevertheless be narrowly 
drafted as to reflect the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving 
public figures.  Despite the potential for greater “hurt” that injurious 
speech may inflict via the Internet as opposed to broadcast channels 
because of its ability to reach more people online, the speaker’s 
ability to remain anonymous, and the low transaction costs involved 
in creating injurious speech, the First Amendment protection should 
not be reduced for this medium.  While I may not agree with the 
Supreme Court’s positing that the Internet may be allowed greater 
First Amendment protection than for example, broadcast TV, I 
would not argue that there be any less.  The legal zone of immunity 
should not be less because limiting free speech protections on the 
Internet would chill writers and speakers in more traditional media, 
given that much of what is written may be published on both print 
and online.  As much sincere sympathy for Megan Meier’s family as 
there may be, under current case law and statutes neither Drew nor 
MySpace could face liability for Meier’s death. 
Finally, in considering the “safe harbor” provisions of the DMCA, 
rather than holding ISPs accountable for content that users post 
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online, it would likely be more effective to have a graduated response 
system.  For example, it may be worth exploring the same “notice and 
takedown” provisions that have protected the copyright holder in the 
intellectual property regime.  These provisions could be applied to 
ISPs, and thus they would not be responsible for removing injurious 
speech unless they are notified and do not respond.  For example, if a 
person sends a message containing injurious speech and the victim 
identifies and substantiates that the message caused them severe 
emotional distress or resulted in physical harm, perhaps the ISPs can 
be required to send a message to the user who wrote the injurious 
speech.  Of course, the threshold should be a very high one to even 
consider involving the ISP in such a matter, so as not to jeopardize its 
free speech protections.  “Notice and takedown” certainly may be 
one way to proceed in certain cases of “cyberbullying,” but is vital to 
prevent ISPs from acting in an overprotective way to avoid liability 
and future policy must be in line with First Amendment policy and 
jurisprudence. 
